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THE RoAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CoNSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA. By A. E. Dick Howard. Charlottesville,
Va.: The University Press of Virginia. 1968. Pp. xv, 533. $10.t
Magna Carta, the most venerable and celebrated document in
the history of the English speaking peoples, is alive and well in

t At the reviewer's request, this Book Review is being published in the precise
form in which it was submitted; no editorial changes of any nature have been made.Ed,

December 1969]

Recent Books

371

American constitutional law. Duncan v. Louisiana, decided by the
Supreme Court in 1968, is recent proof. The states may try petty
offenses without a jury, but if such an offense, simple battery, may
be punished by two years in prison, defendant is entitled to a
trial by jury notwithstanding that he was sentenced to only sixty
days. The Court ruled that trial by jury is a fundamental liberty
protected by the fourteenth amendment against state deprivation
in any case that would come within the sixth amendment's guarantee if tried in a federal court. ~n support of this ruling the Courtremarked that the impressive credentials of jury trial in criminal
cases have been traced "by many" to Magna Carta, but added, in
a fascinating footnote, "Historians no longer accept this pedigree." 1
Magna Carta as the talismanic symbol of the liberty of the subject
has always been greater than its original meaning. Yet the Court
would have been more to the point by adding that although the
famous "judgment of peers" clause of the document of 1215,
chapter thirty-nine, did not originally mean trial by jury, its meaning evolved to require precisely that.
A. E. Dick Howard, Associate Dean and Professor of Law at
the University of Virginia School of Law, describes Magna Carta
in this felicitously entitled book as a "dynamic" document. Its
power owes much to its adaptability, as is true also of our own
Constitution. An antiquarian historicism has not frozen their original meanings. Thus, our commerce clause, once thought not to
empower a federally subsidized road, now applies to racial discrimination in motels, stock-exchange transactions, stolen cars, the
wages of window washers, and telestar communication. So too
Magna Carta became a source for the right against compulsory
self-incrimination, religious liberty, bans on bills of attainder, the
right to travel, and equal justice under the law. Like our Constitution, Magna Carta resembled Martin Chuzzelwit's grandnephew
who, said Dickens, had no more than "the first idea and sketchy
notion of a face." And like our Constitution, the power of Magna
Carta to survive and grow in meaning derives also from the fact
that it incorporates and symbolizes the political values of a free
people and their basic rights. What Magna Carta became, not its
initial character as a genuflection to reactionary feudal magnates,
is what counts. Down the centuries there have been constant reaffirmations of the Great Charter as fundamental. law, embodying
the principle that government is subject to the rule of law, and as
the security of individual rights held against government. That
is what Sir Edward Coke meant in his imperishable remark that
"Magna Carta is such a Fellow, he will have no Sovereign."2
I. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 n.16 (1968).
2. Quoted in ROAD FRO?,{ RUNNYMEDE 120.
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Justice Frankfurter once wrote, "Words being symbols do not
speak without a gloss" which may be the "deposit of history" exacting "a continuous process of application." 3 He was speaking of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, derived from
the original "law of the land" clause of chapter thirty-nine. No
clause of Magna Carta or of our Constitution has undergone more
interpretation or change. In The Road from Runnymede, Dean
Howard reminds us that the Supreme Court is still infusing fresh
vitality in the clause of chapter f~rty Goined with thirty-nine as
chapter twenty-nine in the revision of 1225), which read, "To no
one will We sell, to none will We deny or delay, right or justice."
In 1967 the Court decided the case of a Duke professor who had
participated in a sit-in for the purpose of desegregating a restaurant.
He was indicted on a charge of criminal trespass. After a mistrial,
the local court ordered the case continued, but the prosecutor
entered and received a "nolle prosequi with leave" which under
North Carolina law left the case in a state of suspended animation
until restored to the trial docket on the motion of the prosecution.
Thus, the defendant, unable to get a verdict, lived under a cloud
of suspicion, not knowing when or whether he might be retried.
When he argued that he had _therefore been denied a speedy trial,
the state's high court held against him. The Supreme Court reversed
this judgment, ruling unanimously that the sixth amendment's right
to speedy trial, traceable to Magna Carta, was enforceable against
the states under the fourteenth amendment in accordance with
the same standards that protect defendants against federal violation. 4 Thus in very recent and crucial cases in which the Court
selectively incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment, Magna Carta provided the pretext for
nationalizing the relevant rights.
It would strain a point to argue that Magna Carta had a direct
influence on the growing process of selective incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, as Dean Howard acknowledges. He observes that
when the Court in an earlier time measured due process by English
standards, Magna Carta had precedential value, but when the Court
moved to "the broader plane of 'fundamental' rights" to determine
which should be incorporated, "Magna Carta became simply a
genial godfather watching that same historical process in which
Magna .Carta itself underwent centuries of growth [to] carry the
search for justice even further." 5 This book is a study of that historical process, with the crucial distinction, difficult as it is to
believe, that this is the first and only comprehensive study of Magna
3. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-70 (1952).
4. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
5. RoAD FROM RUNNY.MEDE 363.
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Carta in America. "The burden of the present book," Dean Howard
writes, "is to present one theme, but an important one, in American
history. The aim here is to ·write a kind of history of a document
and the ideas it set loose-the document being Magna Carta, and
the most significant idea being constitutionalism."6 There are, of
course, many notable American books on that idea, among them
Andrew C. McLaughlin's Foundations of American Constitutionalism (1932) and his Constitutional History of the United States
(1935), Arthur E. Sutherland's Constitutionalism in America:
Origin and Evolution of Its Fundamental Ideas (1965), Charles F.
Mullett's, Fundamental Law and the American Revolution (1933),
Benjamin F. Wright's American Interpretations of Natural Law
(1931), Clinton Rossiter's Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of
the American Tradition of Political Liberty (1953), and, above all,
Rodney L. Mott's Due Process of Law: A Historical and Analytical
Treatise (1926), which is closest in subject matter to Howard's
and overlaps it in part.
Dean Howard has chosen a grand theme, and he seems to possess the qualities of mind, style, and experience to execute it
grandly. He holds an M.A. from Oxford, as well as the LL.B., was
a law clerk to Justice Hugo Black for two terms, is executive director of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Revision, has
edited Magna Carta: Text and Commentary (1964), and has published an outstanding study of the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830.7 What Dean Howard appears to lack, however, is
sitzfleisch or the capacity for sustained, arduous research. Parker
of Waddington, Lord Chief Justice of England, in his foreword to
the book describes it as a "scholarly contribution to the study of
American constitutional law and of the lasting significance of Magna
Carta in the world today." 8 That substantially sums up my evaluation, though I would both add and detract from the statement.
The book is in its own right a stirring libertarian document as
well as the history of one, but its value as a work of scholarship is
mixed. Dean Howard's achievement is that he has pulled together
in fine literary form more about Magna Carta's life in America than
has anyone else. On the other hand, his scholarship when judged
by original research and fresh information is distinctly limited;
I would even say disappointingly and inexcusably shallow.
I do not mean that he has not used primary sources, though
with rare exceptions, and then only on tangential points, he has
not touched manuscript sources. That is not, however, the burden
6. Id. at 6.

7. Howard, "For the Common Benefit": Constitutional History in Virginia as a
Casebook for the Modern Constitution-Maker, 54 VA. L. REv. 816-902 (1968).
8. ROAD FROlll RUNNYMEDE xii.

374

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68

of my complaint. Perhaps the use of unpublished materials was
unnecessary; we simply do not know what an intensive exploration
of them might reveal. Dean Howard has relied on published records
of the colonies, charters, statutes, convention proceedings, the writings of statesmen, court cases, legal treatises, a few tracts, and other
easily accessible materials. The trouble is that he did not dig deeply
enough into them. Most of the newspapers for the pre-1800 period
are conveniently available in microform sets, but he did not use
newspapers, though they can be an exceedingly valuable source.
One of the charges against John Peter Zenger, for example, was
that he had printed the accusation that the governor dispensed
with jury trials as he pleased; and in that famous prosecution,
which was fully reported, Zenger's counsel sought bail for him on
the basis of Magna Carta and invoked its great name in his argument to the jury. Dean Howard used a few tracts, mainly obvious
and well-known ones of the era of the American Revolution (17631789), but all tracts, by the thousands, printed in America before
1800 have now been made available in a microform set entitled
Early American Imprints, an invaluable mine that he has not
worked for its payload. Most surprisingly he barely makes use of
the published records of the courts of the various colonies.
Almost four decades ago Richard B. Morris described the legal
history of our colonial period as "the Dark Ages," 9 and Samuel
Eliot Morison wrote: "Legal development is probably the least
known aspect of American colonial history. Judicial opinions were
not recorded in the English colonies, no year-books were issued,
and the printed materials for legal and judicial history have been
so scanty as to preclude the more cautious historians from dealing
with this side of colonial life . . . ." 10 The situation today has
improved considerably. There are now some excellent monographs
on our early legal and, especially, constitutional history, and many
legal records, once thought lost or nonexistent, have been discovered and printed. It is still true that for no colony have the
judicial records been published for the whole span of the long
colonial period, but there are now about seventy miscellaneous
volumes in print, many with excellent and elaborate introductions,
such as the Supreme Court of Judicature of the Province of New
York, 1691-1704, edited in three volumes by Paul M. Hamlin and
Charles K. Baker (1952-1959). Out of curiosity, while writing this
Review, I pulled from my shelves, at random, one such set, Records
of the Suffolk County Court, 1671-1680, and quickly found a petition to the General Court of Massachusetts by one Isaack Melyen
in 1673, in which he said, "My Third Reason for a tryall heare,
9. STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 13 (1930),
10. Morison, ed., Preface, RECORDS OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY

COURT,

1671-1680 (1933).
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being my due Right according to the cheife Law of our Magna
Carta the first Law in the Booke, that noe mans person good name
or Estate shall bee taken away without some Express Law of the
Generall Court warenting it, and suffitiently published."11 What
would tum up of value in a thorough reading of all the colonial
court records in print, as well as the records of prerogative courts
such as that of governor and council, I do not know; but I believe
that Dean Howard should have found out. As Michael G. Kammen observed in his valuable bibliographical review article on
"Colonial Court Records and the Study of Early American History," the publication of these records "has already begun to reshape our thinking about the origins of American legal institutions."12 Kammen's article, together with the works cited in his
first footnote, provides a handy guide to these judicial records that
Dean Howard has neglected. Because his research is so scanty,
includes so few pre-Revolutionary cases, and is based on conventional sources, his book, though the first on the subject, is filled
with familiar material. As I read it, I had that deja vu feeling as
if I had read it once before. There is remarkably little in it that is
new, and quite a bit of old knowledge that should be in it is absent.
What Dean Howard might have turned up had he done the sort
of herculean research that went into Law Enforcement in Colonial
New York: A Study in Criminal Procedure, 1664-1776 (1944) by
Julius Goebel and T. Raymond Naughton is speculative, but
surely The Road from Runnymede would have been vastly improved.
Dean Howard seems to lack the curiosity that would impel
him to explore beyond immediate reach. For example, anyone
working with the Virginia sources would check out Robert Beverley's History and Present State of Virginia (1705) as Dean Howard
did. He discovered that a prisoner applied for a writ of habeas
corpus in 1682 on the basis of chapters thirty-six and thirty-nine
of Magna Carta, rather than under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,
but he does not tell us, because he did not take the trouble of
finding out, whether the prisoner got his writ or what the court
said. The case is Dean Howard's sole example of Magna Carta
being pleaded in a judicial proceeding in colonial Virginia. He
does not even refer to the threat of Governor Francis Nicholson of
Virginia, related in the same source, who in 1703 said the people
"had no Right at all to the Liberties of English Subjects, and that
he wou'd hang up those that should presume to oppose him, with
Magna Carta about their N ecks." 13
11. 1 id. 366.
12. 70 AM. HIST. REv. 732 (1965).
13. R. BEVERLEY, HISrORY OF VIRGINIA 107 (Wright ed. 1947).
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The research seems to be haphazard. Though Dean Howard
used the published Archives of Maryland, which includes fifteen
volumes of judicial records plus many other volumes that give the
proceedings of governor and council on review cases, he refers to
only two cases to show that Magna Carta was pleaded in lawsuits
in Maryland's courts. I do not know how he could have missed
the very important and dramatic case of Sir Thomas Lawrence,
Secretary of Maryland, a judge of the provincial court, and a member of the governor's council. Lawrence was convicted by the
council by an outrageous procedure, appealed to the assembly on
the basis of Magna Carta, and the assembly vindicated English
liberties by supporting him on every point.14 In the course of my
own research on the origins of the free press clause of the first
amendment and of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, 15 I often thought that I had chosen the wrong subjects for
investigation, because my harvest for the colonial period seemed
so slight. As I scanned the pages of the printed primary sources I
had the vivid impression that if I had chosen trial by jury or Magna
Carta generally, I'd have enough material for several volumes.
Magna Carta cropped up in significant ways in numerous cases
(related in my books) that were relevant for my purposes, including, for example, the prosecutions of Bradford and MacComb in
Pennsylvania in 1693, Maule and Fowle in Massachusetts in 1695
and 1754 respectively, and Smith and Moore in Pennsylvania in
1758. Dean Howard mentions none of these, nor has he made an
effort to review the colonial trials of others for the purpose of determining the uses to which Magna Carta was put by defendants
and the interpretations of it by the common-law and prerogative
courts.
His coverage of the pre-Revolutionary period, the first third of
the book, characterizes most of it. What is done is done well, but
the omissions make the result as spotty as a Dalmatian. The history
of Magna Carta in pre-Revolutionary Virginia ends abruptly and
inexplicably with that unresolved case of an application for habeas
corpus in 1682. About 110 pages and eighty-three years later, Virginia re-enters the narrative with resolutions against the Stamp
Act in 1765. Was there no history of Magna Carta in the Mother
Dominion during those more than four score intervening years?
For Massachusetts, another major colony, the story ends with the
adoption of the Lawes and Liberties of 1648 except for a sort of
belated postscript on John Wise and the Ipswich "insurrectioners''
of 1688 who invoked Magna Carta to prove the illegality of a ta.'C
14. 19 .ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 8-14, 89-90.
15. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMER•
ICAN HISTORY (1960) and ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAIN5r SELF·
!NCRIMINATION (1968).
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levied without the consent of their assembly. There are just five
pages touching "other New England colonies," with the accounts
ending almost as they begin, in 1662 for Connecticut, 1641 for
New Hampshire, and 1673 for Rhode Island; and in all instances
the only references are to formal charters and statutes. The use of
sources for Maryland is far more varied, and the account, despite
significant omissions, runs down to the Revolution. This is true of
no other colony. The last references to pre-Revolutionary South
and North Carolina are for 1703 and 1731 respectively. New York
is accorded a mere three pages in a narrative that abruptly ends in
1685 with the disallowance of the Charter of Liberties and Privileges of 1684; there is no reference to the equally relevant and similar charter of 1691. The first reference to New York after 1685 is
in connection with colonial opposition to the Stamp Act. The story
of Magna Carta in New Jersey ends in 1702, shortly after it starts,
when Jersey became a royal colony. There is a long chapter on
William Penn and Pennsylvania, relating his trial in Old Bailey in
1670, his famous account of it which included an appendix of commentary on Magna Carta, his influence on the founding of Jersey
and the colony named for him, his responsibility for the first publication in America of a commentary on Magna Carta, and the various colonial charters, statutes, and disallowances up to 1719, and
then the history of Magna Carta in Pennsylvania is no more. The
pre-Revolutionary coverage includes also a chapter on "English
Laws and English History" and another on "Lawyers and Lawbooks." These discuss the extension of English laws to America, the
Whig view of history, the colonial lawyer and his studies, and legal
treatises, especially the works of Coke. The Whig view of history, as
described by Dean Howard in relation to Magna Carta, omits the
pre-eminently influential Cato's Letters: Essays on Liberty, Civil
and Religious by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon whose four
volumes went through six editions between 1733 and 1755. Dean
Howard supplements his superficial treatment with a footnote referring the reader to the excellent study by Trevor Colbourn,16 but
there are no references to the equally excellent works of Caroline
Robbins, 17 Clinton Rossiter,18 and Bernard Bailyn.19 The question
of the extension of English laws to America revolves almost exclusively on the views of Blackstone and his American critic, St. George
Tucker. The omissions, once again, are major. Similarly, the anal16. THE LAMP OF ExPERIENCE: VVHIG HISTORY AND THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1965).
17. THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN: STUDIES IN THE TRANSMISSION,
DEVELOPMENT, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT (1959).

18. SEEDTllllE OF THE
ICAL LIBERTY (1953).

R.:EPtrauc:

THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF POLIT-

19. PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REvOLUTION,
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REvOLUTION (1967).

1750-1776 (1965);

THE IDEOLOGICAL
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ysis of law books for what they had to say about Magna Carta includes only Coke, Penn, Henry Care, and Blackstone. The discussion of what American lawyers and politicians read and possessed
in their studies makes no reference to New York and to the only
first-rate study we have of the subject, Paul M. Hamlin's Legal Education in Colonial New York (1939), which includes an appendix
of twenty-six pages listing the law books that were in the libraries
of leading New York lawyers-books which Dean Howard should
have scrutinized for their uses of Magna Carta. Declaring at one
point that in England the reliance on Magna Carta as a rallying cry
on behalf of the liberty of the subject against Stuart tyrannies was
not a novel phenomenon because it could be traced back, long before Coke, to a very considerable history, Dean Howard adds: "History was, in a sense, repeating itself in the American colonies.
Through repeated, almost reflexive use-against proprietors, against
governors, against judges, against lesser officials-England's liberty
document was becoming America's liberty document." 20 I agree,
almost instinctively, but on the basis of the slim evidence produced
by Dean Howard, I must conclude that he has not proved his thesis.
The second third of the book treats the era of the American
Revolution, from the writs of assistance case of 1761 to the shape of
American law after the Revolution. These middle chapters cover
the uses of Magna Carta in the development of the colonial constitutional argument against Britain and the influence of Magna Carta
on the writing of the first state constitutions and the United States
Constitution. Dean Howard's account, though elementary for scholars, is remarkable not because he has much that is new to say about
a subject covered so exhaustively by others, but because he manages
to remain interesting. Magna Carta in these chapters sometimes becomes lost or peripheral to the richly textured background. There
are, for example, six pages on James Otis in which Magna Carta
itself is mentioned only with reference to the fact that he owned a
copy of Coke, though Otis's remarks on fundamental law are, of
course, to the point. I am of the belief, however, that giving Otis
twice as much space as the entire colonial history of New York, or
that giving the Stamp Act controversy two and a half times as much
space as the entire colonial history of the New England colonies,
excepting Massachusetts, makes for a peculiarly proportioned book
on the history of Magna Carta in America. The space allocations
through much of the book bear no discernible relationship to the
importance of topics or the availability of evidence. In these middle
chapters I found most illuminating Dean Howard's remarks on the
American blending of a natural rights argument with the authority
of the British constitution. Chapter ten with earlier related material, at pages 166-69, is outstanding on the two traditions of natural
20.

ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE

97.
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and constitutional law and their relationships. There are perspicacious observations too on the reasons that the period beginning with
the framing of the United States Constitution was a watershed in
the American odyssey of Magna Carta.
The concluding chapters covering the era of the Revolution spill
over into the years of the early republic in the nineteenth century.
Here Dean Howard is working less familiar ground; that is, the
subject has not been treated so many times before, and as a result
the book takes on an increasing freshness in content, while the painful gaps of the earlier pages appear far fewer. Nevertheless, the
chapter on the adoption of British statutes necessarily is indebted
to British Statutes in American Law, 1776-1836 by Elizabeth Gaspar
Brown (1964); and, the chapter on "The Shape of American Law
after the Revolution," covering the debate over the common law,
post-Revolutionary study of law, American commentaries, and
Magna Carta as one of the sources of judicial review, attempts too
much in such brief compass. While sketchy, it is an admirable epitome. The section on commentaries would certainly have benefitted
from use of Elizabeth Kelley Bauer's definitive study, Commentaries
on the Constitution, 1790-1860 (1952).
The last third of the book is more analytical than historical.
With very few exceptions, the sources cited are judicial decisions,
state and federal, from the early nineteenth century to the present.
This third of the book is an admirable treatise or commentary on
Magna Carta as part of American case law. The chapters include
"Justice Neither Sold, Denied, Nor Delayed," the transition from
"law of the land" to "due process of law," due process in relation
to attainders and fair procedure, due process in relation to property
and jury trial, and substantive due process ranging from the oldfashioned kind in Lochner v. New York 21 to the newer civil libertarian kind of the Warren Court. These chapters are remarkably
comprehensive and succinct, in effect bringing up to date Mott's
Due Process of Law, although in a style incomparably more readable. In these chapters, as in earlier ones, Magna Carta sometimes
gets submerged in tangential discussions, even in pertinent discussions of the many meanings of due process of law. Now and again,
I think, Dean Howard stretches a point to make it relevant. The
material on attainders may be used to illustrate. Viewed broadly,
a legislative infliction of punishment without judicial trial violates
due process of law by definition. On the other hand, though counsel
in Cummings v. Missouri 22 invoked Magna Carta and won his case,
the opinion of the Court did not mention Magna Carta nor the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; and, in the com21. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
22. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
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panion Test Oath Case, Ex parte Garland, 23 also discussed by Dean
Howard, neither counsel nor the Court considered a due process
issue. Both cases went off expressly on the attainder and ex post
facto clauses. Similarly, Dean Howard discourses on the "landmark"
case of United States v. Brown in which the Court held unconstitutional, as a bill of attainder, an act of Congress making it a crime
for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer of a
labor union. 24 But the opinion of the Court does not rest on the
due process clause of the fifth amendment, and Magna Carta itself
puts in no appearance. In effect, perhaps, Dean Howard has suggested a way for the Court to have improved or buttressed its opinion. His final chapter, entitled "Epilogue," restates his aims in writing this book, his principal findings with respect to the adaptability
and capacity for growth of Magna Carta, and its main uses, new and
old, in American constitutional history. The summation is enlightening, the rhetoric stirring.
The text itself ends at page 382. Interspersed in this handsomely
produced book are sixteen pages of black and white illustrations,
though the relationship of quite a few to Magna Carta is far-fetched.
Footnotes are where they should be, at the bottom of the page, and
are rarely discursive. There is no bibliography. Following the textproper is over a hundred pages of documentary materials, beginning
with "relevant" chapters of Magna Carta. Some of these documents
have been published so often and are so liberally treated in the text
itself that I think their reproduction in the appendices is superfluous. For example, half the documents are familiar staples of the
coming of the American Revolution, such as various resolutions
against the Stamp Act and the Virginia Declaration of Rights of
1776. On the other hand the excerpts from Penn's tract of 1687,
Drayton's "Rights of Englishmen" of 1775, Schley's commentary on
Magna Carta from his 1826 Digest of English Statutes of Force in
the State of Georgia, and the various tables showing state constitutional provisions and statutory compilations based on Magna Carta
are valuable. The book concludes with a table of cases and a useable
index. My own conclusion is that the book itself is valuable as far
as it goes, but that it does not go far enough; that is, it lacks depth
and proportion as a work of history, but until something better
comes along, it will have to serve as the best introduction to the
subject despite its faults, mainly of omission.

Leonard W. Levy,
Earl Warren Professor of
Constitutional History,
Brandeis University
23. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
24. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).

